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Among partisans of greenhouse gas emissions regulation, the Senate’s failure to pass 
the Warner-Lieberman cap-and-trade bill is often attributed to rampant denial, fueled 
by diehard political conservatism, energy-company propaganda, and government 
suppression of evidence on global warming.  If so, the solution to the problem is 
electoral change, exposure of the propaganda, and public education.  However, 
public concern is already so widespread that even leaders of the Southern Baptist 
Convention have acknowledged the need for action.  In this paper, I consider two 
additional forces that have stymied carbon emissions regulation in developing 
countries.  The first is the perception that costly carbon regulation promoted by the 
rich will inflict an unjust burden on the poor.  The second is hostility to taxation of 
critical fossil-fuel resources that were developed long before climate risk was 
identified.  My econometric analysis suggests that these same forces have 
significantly affected senators’ votes on Warner-Lieberman.  By implication, 
Congress is not likely to approve cap-and-trade legislation unless Americans with 
below-median incomes are compensated for expected losses.  My analysis supports 
recent proposals for direct distribution of emissions permit auction revenues to 
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This paper is dedicated to the people of West Virginia and Alabama, my parents’ 
home states.  We won’t solve the climate problem without them.  For valuable 
comments and suggestions, many thanks to Nancy Birdsall, Bill Cline, Richard 
Cooper, Robin Kraft, Lawrence MacDonald, Joel Meister, Darius Nassiry, Brad 
Parks, Vijaya Ramachandran, Kevin Ummel and Dave Witzel.  All remaining errors 
are my own.   1
1.  Introduction 
 
The climate crisis is mounting, but America is at a standstill.  On June 6, 2008, 
domestic cap-and-trade legislation was declared dead for this term when the Warner-
Lieberman bill failed a critical cloture vote in the Senate.
1  Even if the next President 
supports carbon regulation, he will be hard-pressed to ensure Congressional passage 
before the US delegation goes to the Copenhagen climate-change negotiations eleven 
months after Inauguration Day.  Without binding regulation in the US, developing-
countries will simply refuse to accept any limitation on carbon emissions.  In 
summary, we are still headed straight for a climate crisis and the failure of Warner-
Lieberman is potentially tragic. 
How did this happen?  Partisans of greenhouse emissions regulation frequently 
cite rampant denial, fueled by diehard political conservatism, energy-company 
propaganda, and government suppression of evidence on global warming (Gore, 
2007).  In this view, the solution to the problem is electoral change, exposure of the 
propaganda, and public education.  While there is undoubtedly some truth in these 
propositions, they fail to acknowledge the rapid deepening of concern about climate 
change – so rapid, in fact, that even leaders of the Southern Baptist Convention have 
recently acknowledged the threat and the need to act (Banerjee, 2008). 
                                                 
1  The Democrats introduced a cloture vote, attempting to prevent a Republican filibuster of the 
proposed legislation.  The US Senate defines the cloture rule as follows: “The only procedure by which 
the Senate can vote to place a time limit on consideration of a bill or other matter, and thereby 
overcome a filibuster. Under the cloture rule (Rule XXII), the Senate may limit consideration of a 
pending matter to 30 additional hours, but only by vote of three-fifths of the full Senate, normally 60 
votes.” (http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/cloture.htm).  The cloture vote record is 
available from the U.S. Senate at 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=110&session=2
&vote=00145#state 
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In this paper, I look elsewhere for plausible explanations.  Specifically, I 
consider two forces that have stymied carbon emissions regulation in developing 
countries.  The first is a perceived climate of injustice, in which carbon regulation 
promoted by the rich will inflict a disproportionate burden on poor regions that are 
not responsible for the problem and least able to bear the cost of solving it (Roberts 
and Parks, 2006),  The second, in regions with heavy fossil-fuel dependence, is 
hostility to taxation of critical resources that were developed long before climate risk 
was identified.  This paper uses an econometric analysis of the June 6 cloture vote to 
test the impacts of the same two forces on proposed carbon regulation in the US.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, I examine 
variations in income and fossil-fuel dependency across US senators’ home states, 
along with the degree of conservatism in their voting records.  Section 3 estimates the 
relationship between these variables and senators’ votes on the cloture motion of June 
6, with additional controls for party affiliation, gender, campaign contributions from 
the energy sector, and an index of state-level climate threats.  In addition, Section 3 
uses two simulation exercises to assess the independent impacts of states’ income, 
fossil-fuel dependency and conservatism.  In Section 4 I discuss the implications for 
legislative design, while Section 5 provides a summary and conclusions.   
 2.  American Diversity and Its Implications 
 
Although students of economic development stress the importance of absolute 
inequality, a broad literature also documents the political importance of relative 
inequality.  Wounded perceptions of fairness can undermine policy reform when it 
threatens to impose a costly, uniform burden on people whose coping resources are   3
very different (Henrich, et al., 2006; Maslach and Leiter, 2008).  Cap-and-trade 
regulation provides an example, because it will significantly raise the cost of fossil 
energy.  Poor families spend a much higher portion of their incomes on energy than 
rich families (IEA, 2008; Table 10 in this paper), and some regions of the US are 
much more dependent on fossil energy sources than others.  At the same time, of 
course, many Americans are hostile to government regulation on political or 
philosophical grounds.      
Table 1 illustrates American diversity in income, fossil energy dependence and 
political conservatism.  States’ per capita incomes in 2007 varied from $28,846 to 
$54,117; their fossil-fuel dependency in the power sector from 0% to 98.5%; and 
their senators’ conservatism ratings from 0 to 100 on a scale developed by the 
American Conservative Union.  In light of my previous discussion, cap-and-trade 
legislation seems likely to face more resistance from states that are poorer and more 
dependent on fossil fuels, as well as those which lean toward political conservatism.   
I analyze the effects of these factors on the Warner-Lieberman cloture vote, 
which failed to override a threatened filibuster by opponents of the bill.  The data 
seem appropriate for statistical tests because senators’ cloture votes were not 
constrained by individual factors.  Table 2 displays minimum and maximum values 
by vote for all three variables.  For fossil-fuel dependency, both yes and no votes span 
the range from very small percentages to nearly 100 percent.  Conservative ratings 
demonstrate a similar range, with minimum values of 0 for yes and no votes and 
values above 90 for both votes.  Income ranges are also very broad, with nearly-
identical minimum incomes for both votes and a maximum value of $43,226 for no   4
votes cast by the senators from Wyoming, which ranks sixth in income among 
American states (after Connecticut, New Jersey, Massachusetts, New York and 
Maryland).  Under these conditions, statistical analysis can credibly test for 
independent effects. 
3.  Econometric Estimation 
 
3.1  Data 
I draw state-level indicators of income, fossil-fuel dependency and political 
conservatism from the sources cited in Table 1.
2  I also allow for the possible effects 
of party affiliation, gender, campaign contributions from the energy sector, and an 
index of state-level climate threats.  Party affiliation figures prominently in press 
accounts of the cloture vote, so it would be plausible to assert a significant role for 
partisan voting.  I test this proposition with a dummy variable for Republican Party 
membership.  Senators’ votes may also be influenced by campaign contributions from 
vested interests.  I test this by introducing controls for campaign contributions to each 
senator during the 2006 and 2008 electoral cycles, from contributors in five energy-
related sectors identified by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP, 2008):  electric 
utilities, oil and gas, coal mining, transportation and transport unions.  Sectoral 
diversity makes some of these categories problematic.  For example, electric utilities 
include low-carbon energy firms (e.g. providers of nuclear, hydro and renewable 
energy) whose relative market position would improve in a cap-and-trade regime.  I 
therefore test the effects of contributions from individual energy-related sectors, as 
well as total contributions from these sectors.  I also consider energy-sector 
                                                 
2  The full dataset is included in Appendix B.   5
contributions relative to a senator’s total contributions.  This allows for the potential 
importance of small energy-related contributions for senators whose total 
contributions are also small. 
I also test the impact of perceived climate threats on senators’ support for 
Warner-Lieberman.  To construct a threat index, I draw on state-level information 
about climate disasters and emergencies declared by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA, 2008).  I limit the sample to the past five years, the 
period in which public awareness of climate change has rapidly increased.
3  Any 
index of perceived threat is problematic, because no consistently-measured damage 
estimates are available for all relevant categories.  I test three variants on FEMA-
declared disasters and emergencies for individual states:  total counts for five 
categories -- floods, rain storms (including tornadoes), hurricanes, droughts and fires;  
separate category counts for composite floods and storms (which are often reported 
together), hurricanes and fires; and counts divided by state areas.  The latter measure 
seems plausible from a technical standpoint (larger states will have more disaster 
events, other things equal), but less so from a political standpoint (senators from 
larger states will get more calls from climate-affected constituents, but they may not 
take individual calls less seriously than their colleagues from smaller states).   
I specify the following probability model to assess the importance of these 
factors in determining the June 6 cloture vote: 
                                                 
3  Significant events in this context include Hurricane Katrina (2005); the widely-publicized climate 
change lectures of Vice President Al Gore, culminating in the film “An Inconvenient Truth” (2006); 
and publication of the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(2007 - http://www.ipcc.ch/).   6
(1)   i j ij ij ij ij j j ij D P G R C F Y Yes p ε β β β β β β β β + + + + + + + + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ) ( 
 
Where: 
Yesij   = Yes vote on cloture (pro-cap-and-trade) by senator i from state j 
    Yj   = Per capita income in state j (2007) 
    Fj   = Fraction of power provided by fossil fuels in state j (2007) 
    Cij  = American Conservative Union rating of senator i from state j (2007)
 4 
    Rij  = Party affiliation of senator i from state j (1=Republican) 
    Gij  = Gender of senator i from state j (1=female) 
    Pij  = Energy-sector campaign contributions to senator i from state j (2006-2008) 
    Dj  = FEMA-declared climate disasters and emergencies in state j (2004-2008) 
     εj  = A random error term  
 
Predicted effects are β1>0, β2<0, β3<0, β4<0, β6<0, β7>0:  The probability of a 
yes vote should increase with the per capita income of the senator’s state and the 
number of FEMA-declared climate disasters and emergencies.  It should decrease 
with the fraction of power provided by fossil fuels and a senator’s conservative rating, 
Republican party status and energy-sector campaign contributions.  I have no prior 
prediction for the effect of gender.   
3.2  Model Estimation 
I estimate the model by probit for voting senators, predict the yes-vote 
probabilities, translate these to 1-0 outcomes using a threshold probability of 0.6, and 
evaluate the prediction accuracy of the model.
5 
Table 3 reports results for the core regression (column (1) - income, fossil fuel 
dependency and conservative rating), as well as selected experiments with the other 
variables.  The estimated coefficients for income per capita, fossil fuel dependency 
and conservative rating all have the expected signs, and all are significant at the 5% 
or 1% level.  After controlling for these variables, I find no significant effects in any 
                                                 
4  Senator Wicker of Mississippi does not yet have an ACU rating, so I have used the average rating for 
Senator Cochran and Senator Lott, Senator Wicker’s predecessor. 
5  Probit estimation techniques constrain predicted probabilities to the range 0-1.   7
regression for party affiliation, gender, campaign contributions or climate disasters.  
The three core variables, on the other hand, retain their significance and impact 
magnitudes in all the regressions.  Experiments with interactions and alternative 
functional forms for the three core variables did not yield improvements in the 
regression fit. 
3.3  Vote Predictions 
Using the core regression results in Table 3, column (1) I translate the predicted 
probabilities into discrete predictions using a conservative rule that assigns a yes vote 
to probabilities greater than or equal to 0.6.  I present detailed results for correctly-
predicted votes in Appendix A.  As Table 4 shows, the model predicts senators’ votes 
with 92.9% accuracy (6 predicted votes in 84 are incorrect).  Table 5 tabulates the 
incorrect votes.  Notable outliers among the yes votes are Senators Dole of North 
Carolina (p(yes) = .062) and Martinez of Florida (.211); outliers among the no votes 
are Senators Johnson of South Dakota (p(yes)=.979) and Brown of Ohio (.873). 
The prediction results suggest that the yes-no vote split would have been 55-45 
if all senators had voted.
6  Table 6 presents predicted probabilities and votes for the 
16 Senators who were missing.  As predicted by the model, Senators Obama and 
Clinton have since stated that they would have voted yes (Eilperin, 2008).  Senator 
McCain has also stated that he would have voted yes on cloture, despite his very 
small prediction probability (0.12).  Some question remains, since he added that he 
would have opposed the bill on nuclear-related issues.  However, McCain’s strong 
                                                 
6  This is extremely close to the full result (54 – 46) suggested by a related Washington Post story 
(Eilperin, 2008).  However, the story relies on statements by senators who did not have to reveal their 
votes, while the model’s prediction is based on actual behavior and its determinants.  For the full set of 
correct predictions, see Appendix A.   8
support for climate change legislation suggests that he would probably have voted 
yes.   
3.3  Simulation Experiments 
To assess the independent effects of the three core variables, I conduct 
simulation experiments with all combinations of minimum, median and maximum 
sample values of state per-capita incomes, fossil fuel dependencies and conservatism 
ratings.  Using the probit results in Table 3, column (1) I simulate a hypothetical 
senator’s yes-vote probability in each of the 27 cases.  Table 7 reports the full results, 
which indicate large impacts for all three variables.  To illustrate the impact of 
conservatism, the table’s first three rows predict yes-vote probabilities for a 
hypothetical senator with varying degrees of conservatism in a poor state with zero 
dependence on fossil power.  For the maximum conservative rating (100), the model 
predicts a .16 probability of voting yes.  When the conservative rating drops to the 
Senate’s median (30), however, the yes-vote probability jumps to .92.   
For the same hypothetical senator from the same poor state, variations in fossil 
fuel dependency also have powerful effects.  To see this, hold the conservative rating 
constant at its median value of 30 and vary fossil fuel dependency from the minimum 
of 0 (row 1), to the national median (.69 – row 5) and the national maximum (.98 – 
row 8).  Holding the state’s income and the senator’s conservatism constant, these 
changes decrease the probability of a yes vote from .92 to .41, and then to .17. 
Table 8 focuses on the impact of income, since it is particularly important for 
this analysis.  The table reports the distribution of simulation results as state per- 
capita income shifts from the US minimum ($29,000) to the median ($36,000) and   9
the maximum ($54,000).  Each table row summarizes results for all combinations of 
fossil-fuel dependencies (min-median-max) and conservative ratings (min-median-
max).  The powerful impact of income is evident in the results.  For the lowest state 
income, variations in fossil fuel dependency and conservatism generate a range of 
voting probabilities from 0 to .99, with a median probability of .41.  Shifting to the 
median state income leaves the minimum yes-vote probability basically unchanged, 
but the rest of the distribution shifts sharply upward.  The lower-quartile yes-vote 
probability is now .49, the median .76 and the third quartile .96.  Finally, a shift to the 
maximum income has a radical effect on the entire distribution.  Now the minimum 
probability of a yes vote is .53, and the other quartile points are .99 or higher. 
These income results support the proposition that aversion to the regressive cost 
burden of Warner-Lieberman is a powerful deterrent to a yes vote by senators from 
poor states.  In another experiment, I progressively equalize state incomes and 
tabulate the predicted effect on senators’ votes.  In this experiment, I raise the income 
floor for American states in increments of $5,000.  As the floor rises, no state falls 
below it but incomes in states above it are unaffected. Both fossil fuel dependency 
and the conservative rating remain the same for each senator.  Table 9 reports the 
results, starting with the predicted votes of 100 senators at current state per capita 
income, fossil fuel dependency, and the senator’s conservative rating.  The current 
distribution of votes (counting predictions for 16 senators who did not vote on June 6) 
is 55 yes – 45 no.  Raising the income floor by $5,000 shifts the vote to 57-43; 
another $5,000 increase is sufficient to achieve cloture (60-40); another $5,000   10
ensures a veto-proof majority (68-32); and additional increases to the current 
maximum income raise the majority to 93-7 and 100-0.   
4.  Implications of the Results 
 
My results suggest strong, independent impacts of income and fossil fuel 
dependency on cloture votes, regardless of senators’ relative conservatism on other 
issues.  The results support the hypothesis that the votes of senators from states that 
are relatively poor and dependent on fossil fuels are strongly affected by their 
constituents’ aversion to the differential costs imposed by a cap-and-trade system.   
The political implication is clear:  Serious cap-and-trade regulation is unlikely 
to pass the Senate without explicit compensation for differential costs.  This is 
particularly true now, since escalating fossil fuel prices have already increased the 
burden on families with below-median incomes (everywhere for transport, and 
particularly in states whose power sectors are more fossil-dependent).  The most 
straightforward measure, recently proposed by Robert Reich, would be a direct rebate 
from cap-and-trade auction revenues to American families on a per-capita basis 
(Reich, 2008).
7  Recently, the US Energy Information Agency has estimated that a 
100% auction of  emissions credits under Warner-Lieberman would yield about $150 
billion/year by 2020 (EIA, 2008).  Divided equally among 300 million Americans, 
this would provide an annual payment of $500 per person, or $2,000 for a family of 
four. 
Table 10 provides data on 2001 energy and fuel expenditures for families in 
three ranges below the US median family income: $0-$9,999, $10,000-$29,999 and 
                                                 
7  For an equivalent global proposal, see Barnes, et al. (2008).   11
$30,000-$49,999 (EIA 2001, 2005).
8  Their energy and fuel expenditures by group 
were $1,878, $2,306 and $3,022, or 37.6%, 11.5% and 7.6% of total income, 
respectively.
9  According to the EIA’s assessment, enactment of Warner-Lieberman 
would raise total energy and fuel expenditures by 7% to 24% in all three income 
groups.  However, enactment of cap-and-trade with auction payments of $2,000 to 
families in these groups would actually increase their incomes, even after subtracting 
the extra energy and fuel costs.  I calculate the following percent increases in 
household income: 30.9-37.5% ($0-$9,999); 7.2-9.2% ($10,000-$29,999); 3.2-4.5% 
($30,000-$49,999).  I conclude that distributing all auction proceeds to American 
families would result in a significant income increase for families with incomes of 
$50,000 or less.
10  Even a distribution of 30% of the proceeds would leave their total 
incomes unchanged, while emissions reduction would be promoted by the increased 
prices of carbon-intensive energy and fuels relative to the prices of other goods.  This 
would align households with the overall emissions reduction goal, which would be 
enforced by a mandated decline in the national emissions cap over time. 
The program would probably have more popular appeal if claims on auction 
revenues were represented by share certificates that would be issued to individuals on 
request, or held in trust by a public corporation chartered to manage the funds.  
Appendix C provides an illustrative Certified Atmospheric Share (CASH) certificate 
payable from United States Carbon Account Proceeds (USCAP).  The CASH 
                                                 
8  According to the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, the US median family income 
in FY 2008 is $61,500 (http://www.huduser.org/datasets/il/il08/Medians_2008.pdf). 
9  This calculation uses interval midpoint incomes:  $5,000, $20,000, $40,000. 
10  These results are corroborated by a recent Congressional Budget Office study.  For details, see CBO 
(2008).    12
certificate represents the automatic claim on auction revenue by an individual US 
citizen, paid into the individual’s specified account by the Internal Revenue Service.   
This illustration assumes that permits are auctioned annually, with revenues 
divided equally among US citizens.  CASH certificates (and the associated payment 
claims) could be tradable, enabling families to realize the capitalized value of 
expected future payments if they chose to do so.  The registered sale of a CASH 
certificate would automatically transfer its annual payment stream to the buyer.  
Assuming a competitive risk-free interest rate of 5%, a CASH certificate with 
expected future payments of $500 each year could be sold for $10,000, and 
ownership of CASH certificates would add $40,000 to the liquid assets of a four-
person family.   
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I have used econometric analysis to assess senators’ support for 
the Warner-Lieberman cap-and-trade bill as a function of their conservative ratings, 
and their states’ per capita incomes and degrees of fossil-fuel dependency.  My results 
include three findings of particular interest.  First, each of the three factors varies 
across most of its full range, regardless of the values of the other two. This establishes 
a credible foundation for statistical experiments under the assumption of independent 
variation.  Second, all three variables are determinants of senators’ votes at high 
levels of statistical significance.  This finding is robust to the inclusion of controls for 
party affiliation, gender, energy-sector campaign contributions and state-level climate 
disasters.  Third, each of the variables has a very powerful, independent effect.    13
Holding any two variables constant, within-sample variation in the third is generally 
sufficient to move the probability of a yes vote between very low and very high.  
The impact is particularly striking for income, with great significance for the 
topic of this paper.  As the June 6 cloture vote revealed, the Senate cannot achieve 
filibuster-proof support for cap-and-trade legislation under current conditions.  
Undoubtedly, the recent sharp increase in fossil fuel prices has aggravated the 
situation.  Neither fossil-fuel dependency nor senators’ innate conservativism is likely 
to change much in the near term (although a few conservative senators may lose to 
liberals in the fall election), so there is no reason to hope that these variables will 
propel a significant change in the voting pattern.   
Income, however, is another matter.  My results suggest that poor states’ 
aversion to a differential cost burden has significantly weakened support for Warner-
Lieberman.  However, my results also suggest that more senators from states with 
below-median incomes will support Warner-Lieberman, regardless of their 
conservatism or their states’ fossil-fuel dependency, if direct payments from 
emissions permit auctions make below-median households better off.  Assuming that 
permits are fully auctioned, break-even for below-median families appears to require 
direct payments of 30% of total auction revenues.  This could be doubled to ensure 
support, however, while still leaving a vast sum ($60 billion/year for an annual $150 
billion auction) to compensate displaced US workers (particularly coal miners and 
processors) and promote investment in clean technology.  The direct payment system 
could be vested in a trust fund that is separate from standard government accounts, 
and distribution could be delegated to the Internal Revenue Service.  This would be   14
no more difficult than the administration’s current $600 distribution to individuals for 
macroeconomic stimulus.   
The direct-payment system would not have much effect on the overall 
distribution of income, but it would have a powerful effect on the margin where 
household energy expenditures are determined.  Simply allocating a large share of the 
permit auction proceeds on an equal basis to all Americans will actually turn a large 
profit for poorer Americans, even after the impact of Warner-Lieberman on energy 
and fuel costs is taken into account.  This will make many below-median Americans 
absolutely better off and – a critical factor for perceptions of fairness – better off 
relative to more affluent Americans as well.  My econometric and simulation results 
for income strongly suggest that these payments will shift the votes of many senators 
whose conservatism and states’ fossil dependency would otherwise keep them from 
supporting Warner Lieberman.  Given the urgency of the climate problem, Congress 
should consider such a direct payment system as soon as possible.      15
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Table 1:  State-Level Indicators of Income, Fossil-Fuel  
      Dependency and Conservatism 
 














Minimum $28,845 0.0076 0 
Quartile 1  $33,457  0.5264 4 
Median $35,567  0.6872 30 
Quartile 3  $40,480  0.8057 84 
Maximum $54,117  0.9845 100 
 
Sources:  
a US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/spi/2008/xls/spi0308.xls) 
b Carbon Monitoring for Action database (www.carma.org) 
c American Conservative Union, Ratings of Congress (http://www.acuratings.org/) 
 
Table 2:  Min and Max Values of Voting Determinants by Cloture Vote 
 
  Income  Fossil Fuel % of Power  Conservative Rating 
Vote Min  Max Min  Max  Min Max 
No $28,845  $43,226 0.1051  0.9801  0  100 
Yes $29,537  $54,117 0.0076  0.9845  0  92 
   19
                          Table 3: Probit Regression Results 
 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  (7)   (8) 
Dependent Variable (Probability)   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  yes   yes 
% Correct Predictions   93%   93%   86%   90%   93%   90%  92%   93% 
 
Income  per  Capita  0.136 0.135 0.149 0.140 0.152 0.145 0.145    0.155 
    2007  ($10,000)  (2.02)* (2.01)* (2.10)* (2.03)* (2.08)* (2.04)* (2.07)* (2.00)* 
Fossil Fuel % of Power    -2.379  -2.288  -2.151 -2.512 -2.466 -2.520 -2.429 -2.912 
    2007  (2.15)* (2.02)* (1.84)  (2.14)* (2.06)* (2.15)* (2.14)* (2.28)* 
ACU Conservative Rating   -0.034  -0.039  -0.042 -0.034 -0.038 -0.038 -0.034 -0.036 
    2008  (5.55)** (2.71)** (2.51)*  (5.52)** (5.16)** (5.17)** (5.55)** (4.90)** 
Republican     0.444    0.624       
     (0.41)    (0.50)       
F e m a l e       0 . 9 8 1        
      ( 1 . 4 5 )        
FEMA  [Disasters  &  Emergencies]       0.035      
  (Droughts, Floods, Storms, Fires,  Hurricanes)      (0.41)      
FEMA  Hurricanes      0.156    0.159    
      ( 1 . 2 0 )     ( 1 . 2 8 )     
F E M A   F i r e s       - 0 . 3 5 9      
      ( 0 . 5 9 )      
FEMA  Floods  and  Storms        -0.016     
        ( 0 . 1 5 )      
Total  Contributions  From  Electric          0.068   
  Utilities, Oil & Gas, Coal Mines,                (0.57) 
    Transport,  Transport  Unions              
Contributions  from  Electric  Utilities            -0.156 
              ( 0 . 3 5 )  
Contributions  from  Oil  &  Gas  Companies       -0.024 
         ( 0 . 0 6 )  
Contributions  from  Coal  Mine  Companies        1.398 
         ( 1 . 1 7 )  
Constant  -1.513 -1.535 -2.239 -1.751 -2.082 -1.872 -1.957 -1.753 
  (0.64) (0.65) (0.88) (0.71) (0.79) (0.74) (0.78) (0.67) 
Observations    84    84    84    84    84    84    84    84 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    20
Table 4:  Model Prediction Accuracy 
 
Prediction Frequency  % 
  Correct   78  92.9
  Incorrect  6  7.1
Total 84  100.0
 












0.9788  Yes  No Johnson South  Dakota 
0.8730 Yes  No  Brown  Ohio 
0.7172 Yes  No  Dorgan  North  Dakota 
0.4542 No  Yes  Rockefeller West  Virginia 
0.2107 No  Yes  Martinez  Florida 
0.0623 No  Yes  Dole  North  Carolina 
 










0.9999 Yes  Clinton  New  York 
0.9997 Yes  Kennedy Massachusetts 
0.9933 Yes  Obama Illinois 
0.9850 Yes  Biden Delaware 
0.8332 Yes  Specter Pennsylvania 
0.7906 Yes  Gregg New  Hampshire 
0.7172 Yes  Conrad North  Dakota 
0.5919 No  Coleman  Minnesota 
0.5164 No  Stevens Alaska 
0.4758 No  Murkowski Alaska 
0.4542 No  Byrd West  Virginia 
0.2794 No  Craig Idaho 
0.1170 No  McCain Arizona 
0.0775 No  Graham South  Carolina 
0.0532 No  Cornyn Texas 
0.0336 No  DeMint South  Carolina 
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 Table 7:  Simulated Warner-Lieberman Votes 
 











$29,000 0  100  0.1653  No 
$29,000 0  30  0.9202  Yes 
$29,000 0  0  0.9924  Yes 
$29,000 0.69  100  0.0045  No 
$29,000 0.69  30  0.4070  No 
$29,000 0.69  0  0.7837 Yes 
$29,000 0.99  100  0.0004  No 
$29,000 0.99  30  0.1713  No 
$29,000 0.99  0  0.5282  No 
$36,000 0  100  0.4911  No 
$36,000 0  30  0.9908  Yes 
$36,000 0  0  0.9996  Yes 
$36,000 0.69  100  0.0481  No 
$36,000 0.69  30  0.7629 Yes 
$36,000 0.69  0  0.9587 Yes 
$36,000 0.99  100  0.0087  No 
$36,000 0.99  30  0.5007  No 
$36,000 0.99  0  0.8465 Yes 
$54,000 0  100  0.9923  Yes 
$54,000 0  30  1.0000  Yes 
$54,000 0  0  1.0000  Yes 
$54,000 0.69  100  0.7826 Yes 
$54,000 0.69  30  0.9992 Yes 
$54,000 0.69  0  1.0000 Yes 
$54,000 0.99  100  0.5268  No 
$54,000 0.99  30  0.9928 Yes 
$54,000 0.99  0  0.9997 Yes 
 
Table 8:  Impact of State Income Per Capita 
                Yes-Vote Probabilities For 27 Simulations 
 













$29,000 0.00  0.17 0.41 0.78 0.99 
$36,000 0.01  0.49 0.76 0.96 1.00 
$54,000 0.53  0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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 No  Yes  Total 
$29,000  
(Current) 
45 55  100
$34,000 43  57  100
$39,000 40  60  100
$44,000 32  68  100
$49,000 7  93  100
$54,000 0  100  100
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Table 10:  Projected Impacts of Warner-Lieberman (EIA, 2008) 
 
    Family Income Range 






Midpoint Income    $5,000 $20,000 $40,000 
Household Spending          
   Energy    1,039 1,260 1,456 
   Transport    839 1,046 1,566 
Total   1,878 2,306 3,022 
Income Share    0.3756 0.115313 0.07555 
        
Cost Increase         
   Energy         
       Low  5% 51.9 63.0 72.8 
       High  27% 280.5 340.2 393.1 
   Transport         
       Low  9% 75.5 94.2 140.9 
       High  21% 176.2 219.7 328.9 
Projected Cost Increases         
Low Increase    127.46 157.16 213.74 
High Increase    456.72 559.91 721.98 
% Cost Increases         
Low Increase    6.79% 6.81% 7.07% 
High Increase    24.32% 24.28% 23.89% 
        
Total Revenue ($Billion)  150      
Population (Million)  300      
        
Family Payment  2,000 2,000 2,000 
Percent Allocated  100.00%      
Family Size  4      
        
Net Gain         
Low Increase    1,873 1,843 1,786 
High Increase    1,543 1,440 1,278 
        
Income Increase         
Low Increase    37.5% 9.2% 4.5% 
High Increase    30.9% 7.2% 3.2% 
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                   Appendix A 
       Correctly-Predicted  Votes 
 
Correctly-Predicted Yes Votes  Correctly-Predicted No Votes 
State Senator  P(Yes)  State Senator  P(Yes) 
Connecticut Dodd  1.0000  Louisiana  Landrieu  0.5627 
Connecticut Lieberman  1.0000  Ohio  Voinovich  0.3117 
New Jersey  Lautenberg  1.0000  Idaho  Crapo  0.3027 
New Jersey  Menendez  1.0000  Nebraska  Hagel  0.2034 
New York  Schumer  0.9999  Nevada  Ensign  0.2012 
Washington Murray  0.9999  South  Dakota  Thune  0.1679 
Washington Cantwell  0.9998  Tennessee  Alexander  0.1586 
Vermont Leahy  0.9997  Wyoming  Enzi  0.1081 
Vermont Sanders  0.9995  Tennessee Corker  0.1079 
Massachusetts Kerry  0.9994  Indiana  Lugar  0.1065 
Maryland Mikulski  0.9992  Texas  Hutchison  0.0897 
Maryland Cardin  0.9992  Colorado Allard  0.0860 
California Feinstein  0.9987  Wyoming Barrasso  0.0849 
California Boxer  0.9980  Alabama  Sessions  0.0766 
Illinois Durbin  0.9967  Kansas  Roberts  0.0678 
Oregon Wyden  0.9938  North  Carolina  Burr  0.0623 
Minnesota Klobuchar  0.9885  Iowa  Grassley  0.0595 
Nevada Reid  0.9880  Kansas  Brownback  0.0555 
Virginia Webb  0.9853  Alabama  Shelby  0.0550 
Rhode Island  Reed  0.9852  Georgia  Chambliss  0.0510 
Rhode Island  Whitehouse  0.9852  Louisiana  Vitter  0.0404 
Pennsylvania Casey  0.9800  Missouri  Bond  0.0387 
Hawaii Akaka  0.9713  Georgia Isakson  0.0383 
Hawaii Inouye  0.9713  Arizona  Kyl  0.0308 
Delaware Carper  0.9711  Mississippi  Cochran  0.0186 
Florida Nelson  0.9624  Mississippi  Wicker  0.0164 
Colorado Salazar  0.9480  Utah  Bennett  0.0159 
Wisconsin Kohl  0.9457  Utah  Hatch  0.0146 
Michigan Levin  0.9332  New  Mexico  Domenici  0.0137 
Wisconsin Feingold  0.9290 Oklahoma  Inhofe  0.0095 
Michigan Stabenow  0.9137  Oklahoma  Coburn  0.0095 
Iowa Harkin  0.8473  Kentucky  Bunning  0.0035 
Oregon Smith  0.8429  Kentucky McConnell  0.0035 
Maine Snowe  0.8266       
Montana Tester  0.8115      
Arkansas Lincoln  0.8059       
Arkansas Pryor  0.7867       
Missouri McCaskill  0.7832       
Nebraska Nelson  0.7788       
Montana Baucus  0.7726      
Virginia Warner  0.7521       
Maine Collins  0.7483       
New Hampshire  Sununu  0.6556       
Indiana Bayh  0.6504       
New Mexico  Bingaman  0.6347       
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                    Appendix B 










Rating Party Gender P(Yes) Vote Senator 
ACU 
Rating Party Gender P(Yes) Vote 
 
Alabama $32,404  0.6286  Sessions  83  R  M  0.0766 No  Shelby  88  R  M  0.0550 No 
Alaska $40,352  0.7361  Stevens  64  R  M  0.5164  Missing Murkowski  67  R  F  0.4758 Missing 
Arizona  $33,029  0.6069  McCain  80  R  M 0.1170  Missing  Kyl  100  R  M 0.0308  No 
Arkansas $30,060  0.5747  Lincoln 10  D  F  0.8059 Yes  Pryor  12  D  M  0.7867 Yes 
California $41,571  0.4733  Feinstein 0  D  F 0.9987  Yes Boxer  4 D  F 0.9980  Yes 
Colorado  $41,042  0.9096  Salazar  8  D  M 0.9480  Yes  Allard  96  R  M 0.0860  No 
Connecticut  $54,117  0.4208  Dodd  0  D  M 1.0000  Yes  Lieberman  8  I  M 1.0000  Yes 
Delaware  $40,608  0.7706  Biden  0  D  M 0.9850  Missing  Carper  8  D  M 0.9711  Yes 
Florida  $38,444  0.7538  Nelson  4  D  M 0.9624  Yes  Martinez  80  R  M 0.2107  Yes 
Georgia $33,457  0.6470  Chambliss  92  R  M 0.0510  No  Isakson  96  R  M 0.0383  No 
Hawaii $39,239  0.8057  Akaka 0  D  M  0.9713 Yes  Inouye  0  D  M  0.9713 Yes 
Idaho  $31,197  0.1051  Crapo  88  R  M 0.3027  No  Craig  90  R  M 0.2794  Missing 
Illinois  $40,322  0.5264  Durbin  0  D  M 0.9967  Yes  Obama  7  D  M 0.9933  Missing 
Indiana  $33,616  0.9494  Bayh  12  D  M 0.6504  Yes  Lugar  60  R  M 0.1065  No 
Iowa  $35,023  0.8186  Harkin  8  D  M 0.8473  Yes  Grassley  84  R  M 0.0595  No 
Kansas $36,768  0.7759  Roberts  92  R  M  0.0678 No  Brownback  95  R  M  0.0555 No 
Kentucky $31,111  0.9595  McConnell  92  R  M 0.0035  No  Bunning  92  R  M 0.0035  No 
Louisiana  $34,756  0.7105  Landrieu  40  D  F  0.5627 No  Vitter  96  R  M  0.0404 No 
Maine  $33,722  0.4938  Snowe  28 R  F 0.8266  Yes Collins  36 R  F 0.7483  Yes 
Maryland  $46,021  0.6601  Cardin  0  D  M  0.9992 Yes  Mikulski  0  D  F  0.9992 Yes 
Massachusetts $49,082 0.7376 Kennedy  0  D  M 0.9997  Missing  Kerry  4  D  M 0.9994  Yes 
Michigan  $35,086  0.6796  Levin  4  D  M  0.9332 Yes  Stabenow  8  D  F  0.9137 Yes 
Minnesota $41,034  0.6947  Klobuchar 4  D F  0.9885  Yes  Coleman 64  R  M  0.5919  Missing 
Mississippi $28,845  0.7011  Cochran  83  R M 0.0186  No  Wicker  84.5  R  M 0.0164  No 
Missouri  $34,389  0.8840  McCaskill  8  D  F  0.7832 Yes  Bond  83  R  M  0.0387 No 
Montana $32,458  0.6173  Tester  16  D  M  0.8115 Yes  Baucus  20  D  M  0.7726 Yes 
Nebraska  $36,471  0.6662  Nelson  32  D  M 0.7788  Yes  Hagel  79  R  M 0.2034  No 
Nevada  $40,480  0.7269  Reid  0  D  M 0.9880  Yes  Ensign  91  R  M 0.2012  No 
New  Hampshire  $41,512  0.3656  Gregg  72  R  M 0.7906  Missing  Sununu  84  R  M 0.6556  Yes 









Rating Party Gender P(Yes) Vote Senator 
ACU 
Rating Party Gender P(Yes) Vote 
 
New  Mexico  $31,474  0.9591  Bingaman  4  D  M 0.6347  Yes  Domenici  79  R  M 0.0137  No 
North  Carolina  $33,636  0.6156  Dole  92  R  F  0.0623 Yes  Burr  92  R  M  0.0623 No 
North Dakota  $34,846  0.9406  Conrad  12  D  M 0.7172  Missing  Dorgan  12  D  M 0.7172  No 
Ohio  $34,874  0.8757  Brown  0  D  M 0.8730  No  Voinovich  48  R  M 0.3117  No 
Oklahoma  $34,153  0.8706  Coburn  100  R  M 0.0095  No  Inhofe  100  R  M 0.0095  No 
Oregon  $34,784  0.2411  Wyden  4  D  M 0.9938  Yes  Smith  48  R  M 0.8429  Yes 
Pennsylvania $38,788  0.6007  Casey  8  D  M 0.9800 Yes  Specter  40  R  M  0.8332 Missing 
Rhode  Island $39,463  0.7023  Reed  0  D  M 0.9852  Yes  Whitehouse 0  D  M 0.9852  Yes 
South Carolina  $31,013  0.4752  Graham  88  R  M  0.0775 Missing DeMint  100  R  M  0.0336 Missing 
South Dakota  $33,905  0.4470  Johnson  0  D  M 0.9788  No  Thune  88  R  M 0.1679  No 
Tennessee  $33,280  0.5986  Alexander  76  R  M 0.1586  No  Corker  83  R  M 0.1079  No 
Texas  $37,187  0.7942  Hutchison  88  R  F  0.0897 No  Cornyn  96  R  M  0.0532 Missing 
Utah  $31,189  0.9756  Bennett  75  R  M 0.0159  No  Hatch  76  R  M 0.0146  No 
Vermont $36,670  0.0076  Leahy  0  D  M  0.9997 Yes  Sanders  4  I  M  0.9995 Yes 
Virginia  $41,347  0.5811  Webb  16  D  M 0.9853  Yes  Warner  60  R  M 0.7521  Yes 
Washington $40,414  0.1475  Murray  0  D  F 0.9999  Yes Cantwell  4 D  F 0.9998  Yes 
West Virginia  $29,537  0.9845  Byrd  8  D  M  0.4542 Missing Rockefeller  8  D  M  0.4542 Yes 
Wisconsin  $36,047  0.7478  Kohl  0  D  M 0.9457  Yes  Feingold  4  D  M 0.9290  Yes 
Wyoming  $43,226  0.9801  Enzi  96  R  M 0.1081  No  Barrasso  100  R  M 0.0849  No 
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                   Appendix C 
                      Model Certified Atmospheric Share (CASH) Certificate 





    Background graphic image source:  www.corpkit.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 